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Regime Change and Conflict Recidivism within
Rivalry: Interludes in Disputes1
BANN SENG TAN
College of William and Mary
Abstract: How does regime change affect the risk of militarized disputes? Within the democratic
peace literature, there is disagreement over whether it is democratization, autocratization, political
dissimilarity or political instability that is particularly perilous. I distinguish four perspectives from
this literature and test their attendant hypotheses on a dataset of conflict episodes within enduring
rivalry from 1816 to 2001 using survival analysis. I find that both democratization and autocratiza-
tion reduce the hazard of dispute recurrence in enduring rivalries. After controlling for selection
bias, the effect of democratization was robust whereas the effect of autocratization was not.
Democratization also has the additional property of terminating rivalries; autocratization does not.
Together, the results imply that democratization is better at promoting a transition from rivalry to
peaceful relations than is the autocratization of a rivalry dyad.
KEYWORDS: Regime Change, Democratization, Survival Analysis, Conflict Recidivism
Introduction
The promotion of democracy is a cornerstone of the foreign policies of Western democra-
cies. For example, a commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law lies at
the heart of the Treaty on European Union. In its European neighborhood, democracy
promotion is part of the EU’s enlargement strategy and shapes its foreign policy towards
aspirant states (Kelley 2006). Similarly, NATO membership requires aspiring states to be
democratic and to respect civil and political rights. While a belief in the intrinsic value of
democracy underpins this policy of democracy promotion, it is also buttressed by a ratio-
nale that democracy is an effective means to other valuable policy ends. This rationale is
not only grounded in normative beliefs, but also in extensive theoretical and empirical
research on the beneficial effects of democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Bueno
de Mesquita et al 2003). For instance, the democratic peace literature (Kant 1795; Babst
1972; Doyle 1983; Dorussen and Ward 2008) emphasizes the stable, pacific nature of rela-
tions between democratic states and speculates that this pacifying effect would be enhanced
if more governments democratized.
The enthusiasm for democracy promotion, however, has been tempered by the argu-
ment that the democratization process itself may increase the chance of interstate war
(Mansfield and Snyder 1995). What is more, Mansfield and Snyder (2005: chp 6) have
extended their cautionary note to the context of ongoing rivalry. In such an environ-
1I thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita for his advice and the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies for its
financial support. Any errors that remain are my sole responsibility.
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ment, where tensions are already high, the transition to democracy by one of the rivals
may foster a perceived opportunity that leads to renewed conflict and perhaps even
regional instability. If so, policy-makers may have to consider a tradeoff between the
benefits of spreading democracy and the short-term threat it might represent to interna-
tional stability. Sound policy inferences require not only good theory behind them but
also rigorous evidence as to the conditions under which this or that theory finds support
in the record of history. In short, we need to establish what precisely the record shows
with regard to the transition to democracy and the mitigation or increased risk of violent
conflict.
It is on the clarification of the empirical record that I focus here. Although theory build-
ing is an important and valuable undertaking, we currently have several carefully crafted
theories of the democratic peace and of enduring rivalry but, thus far, little has been done
to link them empirically in a way that helps us explore the alternative, subtle implications
of these theories. Testing the nuanced implications of alternative explanations is essential
to resolving which arguments are most consistent with actual behavior. This paper is
intended to contribute to that empirical resolution by re-examining the relationship
between regime change and interstate conflict in the important context of enduring rivalries
(Diehl and Goertz 2000).
As we know, the democratic peace literature identifies a pacifying influence of demo-
cratic governance but the literature on democratization raises questions about when that
pacifying influence kicks in. Daxecker (2007: 534) observed that the argument that democ-
ratization causes war assumes that an “opportunity for the external use of force exists.”
Of course, broadly speaking, such an opportunity can always exist between states but
clearly that opportunity is heightened if the democratizing state is already engaged in an
ongoing rivalry. With that fact in mind, this article supplements Daxecker (2007) by add-
ing rivalry as a domain for testing the marginal impact of democratization on subsequent
conflict. By focusing on regime change within rivalry, this article expands on earlier
research on the democratic peace (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2005; Gleditsch
and Ward, 2000; Kurizaki, 2004; Daxecker, 2007), placing it within the rivalry context
(Bennett 1996, 1997, 1998; Prins and Daxecker 2007). The article proceeds as follows.
First, the pertinent literatures are reviewed. Next, I extrapolate from the literature multiple
perspectives on democratization and identify their hypotheses. I then test these alternative
perspectives with data on conflict episodes between enduring rivals from 1816 to 2001
using survival analysis. In the concluding section, I discuss the implications of the find-
ings.
The Democratization-Conflict Linkage in the Democratic Peace
The democratic peace is such a robust finding that it is considered to be “as close as any-
thing we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy 1989: 88). Some policy-
makers, notably within the United States, have interpreted this as an imperative to
promote democracy (Clinton 1994; Rice 2005). Mansfield and Snyder challenged this pre-
scription with their finding that democratization itself increases the prospects for war
(Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Democratization, they argue, opens a previously closed
political system to increased political demands by the populace. Elites, who desire office,
react by adopting nationalism as a mass mobilization strategy. The wars that democratiz-
ing states engage in are by-products of a belligerent foreign policy that nationalism engen-
ders. Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995) provocative findings attracted critical attention
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(Thompson and Tucker, 1997; Enterline, 1996; Gleditsch and Ward, 1998; Oneal and
Russett, 1998). One critique notes that they used a monadic research design that leaves the
dyadic effects of democratization unaddressed (Oneal and Russett, 1998; Maoz 1998).
Mansfield and Snyder addressed this objection in subsequent works (Mansfield and Snyder
2002a and b). They modified their argument to claim that incomplete democratization, or
transitions from autocratic to partially democratic regimes (anocracy), increase conflict
propensities (that is, the onset of war and of militarized disputes). Their modified argu-
ment distinguishes between mature democracies, which have the institutional capacity to
cope with demands for political participation without resorting to nationalism as a mobili-
zation strategy, and anocracies, which do not. The tenor of their argument is clear, democ-
ratization is posited to increase conflict propensity. This constitutes the first distinct
perspective on the democratization-conflict linkage.
The other three perspectives evolved out of reactions to Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995)
dangerous democratization thesis. If belligerent conflict behavior provides benefits to elites
during democratization, Gleditsch and Ward reasoned, the same dynamic should also
apply to elites in mature democracies (Gleditsch and Ward 1998: 53). This implies that the
democratic peace and dangerous democratization are contradictory phenomena. The group
of scholarship that tends towards this view finds a negative relationship between democra-
tization and the propensity for conflict (Gleditsch and Ward, 1998, 2000; Enterline, 1996;
Enterline 1998a and b, Bennett and Stam 2004). The notion of pacific democratization;
that the extension of the democratic peace logic to democratization implies a peaceful tran-
sition, constitutes the second perspective on the democratization-conflict linkage. I will
elaborate on the theoretical arguments for this perspective in a later section when I discuss
the impact of democracy on enduring rivalry.
Instead of democratization as the cause of increased conflict, a subset of advocates
of pacific democratization suggests autocratization as the cause (Enterline 1996: 191;
Enterline 1998a: 404; Thompson and Tucker, 1997: 445; Daxecker, 2007:544). This dan-
gerous autocratization thesis is not well-developed theoretically due to its origins as an
empirical afterthought in the debate between dangerous versus pacific democratization.
It was not till Daxecker’s re-examination of the democratization-conflict linkage that a
tangential account of how autocratization might affect conflict propensity is developed
(Daxecker 2007). Her account is based on an informational approach to crises bargain-
ing (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001). Under the informational approach, clear signals pre-
vent conflict and regime-types affect the credibility of signals sent. Unlike autocratic
leaders, democratic leaders face high domestic audience costs for foreign policy failures
which they cope with by sending credible signals that make it easier for opponent
states to determine the resolve of democracies compared to autocracies. Applying the
informational logic to transitioning states, Daxecker reasoned that autocratization
reduces the credibility of signals and thus increases conflict propensity (Daxecker 2007:
536-7). This dangerous autocratization constitutes the third perspective on the democra-
tization-conflict linkage.
The last perspective is an implication from the autocratic peace literature (Peceny, Beer
and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Werner 2000). Given that the management of domestic affairs
is a potential source of interstate conflict, dyads where states manage their domestic
affairs in similar fashion or politically similar dyads should have lower conflict propensi-
ties compared to politically dissimilar dyads. The democratic peace and the autocratic
peace are seen as subsets of a general peace between politically similar regimes (Weart
1998). Applying this logic to regime transitions implies that transitions into politically
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similar dyads (joint democracy or joint autocracy) should reduce conflict.2 However,
transition into mixed dyads, between two politically dissimilar regimes, is anticipated to
be more conflictual. The transitions that result in political dissimilarity are especially
interesting since this prediction is distinguishable from the transitions covered in prior
perspectives.
In sum, there are multiple perspectives. The dangerous democratization thesis argues
that democratization increases conflict propensity while the pacific democratization thesis
argues for the opposite. The dangerous autocratization thesis argues that autocratization
increases conflict propensity while the political dissimilarity thesis that transition to a
mixed dyad increases conflict propensity.
Placing the democratization-conflict perspectives in the rivalry context
Some studies of the democratization-conflict linkage emphasize the importance of the con-
text in which regime transitions occur. This context may be viewed in terms of dyads, in
which case the opponent’s regime-type is the issue (Kurizaki, 2004). This context may be
view in terms of political geography, in which case how a neighborhood of a transitional
state develops over time is the issue (Enterline, 1998b; Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Gled-
itsch and Ward, 1998). Finally, the context could be based on conflict itself, in which case
the rivalry between states is the issue (Bennett 1996).3 Rivalries are also significant for
empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, it was found that a disproportionate
amount of interstate conflict, both militarized interstate disputes and wars, occur between
rivals (Goertz and Diehl 1992). Furthermore, it is within rivalry where one would expect
nationalistic feelings, posited by Mansfield and Snyder (2005) to be the cause of dangerous
democratization, to be most prevalent.4 Thus examining the effects of democratization in
the context of rivalry is a hard test of the democratic peace since it is within rivalry where
the chances of conflict are posited to be highest.
Earlier research on the effects of democratization on conflict behavior in rivalry tends
toward two views. We know that democracies tend not to become rivals and that transi-
tions to democracy tend to terminate rivalry (Bennett, 1998; Hensel, Goertz and Diehl,
2000). Together, this has the effect of making democratic rivalry relatively rare. Indeed,
democratic rivalries are rare but that does not tell us much about the competing views of
democratic transitions nor does it help us ascertain whether such transitions are pacifying
or not.5 Here I am concerned with the pattern of conflict in rivalries and how, if at all, it
2 I follow the convention of classifying pairs of state according to regime type. Applied to rivalry research, this
distinction generates the following typology, democratic rivalries (two democratic rivals), mixed rivalries (one
democratic and one autocratic rival), and autocratic rivalries (two autocratic rivals).
3 The conflict-begets-conflict literature, which predates the democratic peace, presents an alternative way of think-
ing about conflict contexts. There, conflict can spread across time and/or across space. The former notion is
explored in the protracted conflict literature (Azar, Jureidini, McLaurin 1978) while the later is explored in the
war diffusion literature (Siverson and Starr, 1991). In that sense, rivalry captures both the temporal and spatial
aspects of conflict diffusion.
4 I thank Michael Colaresi for this observation.
5 A possible point of confusion is the relationship between democratization, rivalry termination and the nature of
the termination. In theory, a rivalry can end violently or peacefully. A violent termination occurs when one rival
decisively defeats its opponent and essentially imposes its terms, thereby ending the rivalry. Due to the possibility
of violent as well as of peaceful rivalry termination, it is possible for democratization to encourage rivalry termi-
nation without knowing whether the process of rivalry termination is peaceful or violent. This is, of course, an
issue which the article explores.
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differs depending on whether the rivalry has experienced a significant change in the
regime-type of one or both adversaries. Such a regime transition provides a natural experi-
ment in which to test the competing views of democratization.
This issue, as I have noted, is poorly understood.
One approach has been to settle closely related questions almost by definition. For
instance, in a study that in part expresses concerns about the meaning of democratic rival-
ries, Goertz et al (2005) contend that, “if a rivalry has occurred in a democratic dyad, this
means that the democratic peace has in some sense already failed” (Goertz, Jones, Diehl
2005: 755). Perhaps so, but the very phrase, “in some sense” suggests that this inference
should be tested. It is not established. Rather than inferring that the democratic peace has
failed, we would benefit from exploring conflict behavior within rivalry, comparing cases
of regime transition to cases where that has not occurred. It is certainly possible that the
frequency of disputes within the rivalry may be dramatically influenced by the regime
transition. Does democratization, in the absence of rivalry termination, exacerbate an
ongoing rivalry? Is it a replay of the dangerous democratization argument all over again?
To help answer these questions, I look specifically at conflict behavior within rivalries,
focusing on changes in the frequency of dispute recurrence as a function of changes in
regime types.
Two other views, focused on rivalry termination nevertheless, provide a complement to
the questions I wish to explore. Bennett (1997) and Prins and Daxecker (2007) offer theo-
ries of rivalry termination that can be nicely extended to address, as well, the variation in
dispute patterns following regime change within a rivalry. With regards to conflict behav-
ior of democratizing states, Bennett argues:
…democratization should increase the probability of long-term rivalry settlement. How-
ever, this is not necessarily inconsistent with Mansfield and Snyder’s finding that democra-
tization and autocratization lead to war. Rivalry termination often follows relatively soon
after a dispute or war between rivals, as such conflicts may settle disputed issues decisively
or lead rivals to negotiate seriously over those issues. It is possible for democratization (or
autocratization) to lead to a war or dispute that then results in rivalry settlement (Bennett,
1997: 379).
In his formulation, the same increase in conflict propensity could promote rivalry termi-
nation. Bennett finds that democratizing dyads terminate quickly. I build on this idea to
ascertain whether the change to joint democracy alters the risk of subsequent fighting and
hypothesize, as explained later, that it alters rivalry behavior in favor of pacification even
before rivalry termination.
Prins and Daxecker present another theoretical alterative based on the informational
approach to crises bargaining (Prins and Daxecker 2007). They treat the persistence of riv-
alry as a kind of bargaining failure. Both information asymmetry and non-credible commit-
ments cause bargaining failures. In the case of rivalry, they argue, information asymmetry
is not the issue; the absence of credible commitment is. Rivals, by definition, have already
had repeated militarized confrontations with each other and so their information about
each other’s resolve and capability is likely to be updated and hence accurate. Democracy,
they argue, ameliorates rivalry by increasing trust (due to the transparency of its decision-
making process) and increases the cost of defection (through domestic audience costs).
Although both the issue-resolution and informational dynamics perspectives seek to
explain rivalry termination, their logics can be extended to conflict behavior within rivalry.
In the case of Bennett, democratization could increase the chance of conflict, at least in the
short-term (Bennett, 1997: 379). In the case of Prins and Daxecker, democratization could
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decrease the chance of conflict (Prins and Daxecker 2007: 25-27). The former dovetails
more closely with the dangerous democratization thesis while the latter dovetails with the
pacific democratization thesis.
One issue to be addressed is the appropriate conceptualization of the absence of conflict
within rivalry. If the resolution of the issues underlying the rivalry constitutes rivalry ter-
mination, the outbreaks of militarized interstate disputes (or MIDs) within rivalry repre-
sents symptoms or manifestations of an underlying conflictual relationship. While the
absence of outbreaks of violence need not necessarily indicate peaceful relations between
rivals, the interlude between conflict outbreaks occupies a conceptual middle-ground
between all-out hostilities and a positive peace (Klein, Diehl, Goertz 2008). As such, longer
interludes compared with shorter interludes, are more suggestive of conflict amelioration
within rivalry. The question is how a disruptive change such as a regime change in rivals,
affects the risk of a rivalry experiencing the next outbreak of conflict. The extant literature,
which has four perspectives on how that risk of conflict outbreak is posited to vary,
implies the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Transitions into democratic rivalry increase the risk of an outbreak of the next mil-
itarized interstate dispute (that is, it increases the hazard of MID occurrence).
Hypothesis 1b: Transitions into democratic rivalry decrease the risk of an outbreak of the next mil-
itarized interstate dispute.
Hypothesis 2: Transitions into autocratic rivalry increase the risk of an outbreak of the next mili-
tarized interstate dispute.
Hypothesis 3: Transitions into mixed rivalry increase the risk of an outbreak of the next milita-
rized interstate dispute.
Lengthy interludes may be a precursor to rivalry termination or just a spell during which
regime change is consolidated. Regime change, as argued by Mansfield and Snyder and
also by Gleditsch and Ward, may make the new regime leadership interested in seeking a
diversionary dispute or it may encourage the other member of the rivalry pair to see an
opportunity for gain through dispute initiation (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Gleditsch
and Ward, 1998). Regardless of which account explains behavior, if regime change pro-
vokes disputes then we should anticipate that both democratization and autocratization
reduce the odds that the rivalry will terminate. However, if the democratic peace perspec-
tive is borne out, then autocratization may reduce the odds of termination – the demo-
cratic peace literature is largely agnostic on this question – but democratization should
significantly increase the odds of rivalry termination.
Hypothesis 4a: Dyadic regime transitions decrease the probability of rivalry termination.
Hypothesis 4b: Democratization increases the probability of rivalry termination whereas autocrati-
zation does not.
If the dangerous transitions argument is correct then hypotheses 4a should be supported.
If the democratic peace contention is correct, then hypotheses 4b should be backed by the
empirical record.
Since rivalry by definition must entail states engaged in conflict, the possibility that such
participation affects subsequent regime change becomes an issue. In one strand of litera-
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ture that focuses on democratization, Horowitz (2003) argued that participation in war
can retard democratization in post-communist transitions. In another related strand, it is
the absence of conflict, whether operationalized as settled borders (Gibler and Tir 2010) or
as a peaceful environment (Thompson 1996), that facilitates subsequent democratization.
Since reverse causation is a legitimate theoretical concern, the analysis that follows should
be understood as applicable only to the context of regime change within enduring rivalry.
Given my focus on the effects of regime change on conflict behavior, I have no theoreti-
cal stake in the reverse causation narrative. Rather, my concern is to control for the poten-
tial selection bias reverse causation may create. I address this issue methodologically in
subsequent sections. The aim is to assess the effects of the regime transitions on subse-
quent conflict behavior after controlling for the impact of prior conflict behavior has on
subsequent regime change.
Data and Methods
The hypotheses focus on the conflict behavior of transitioning dyads. For the domain of
rivalry, I adopt the rivalry conception by Klein, Goertz and Diehl, widely used in the riv-
alry literature (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006).6 They operationalize a rivalry as a pair of
states that has fought a minimum of three militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) over the
whole 1816-2001 period.7 To build dyadic information for MIDs within rivalry, I use the
MID 3.1 dataset (Bremer, Jones, and Singer, 1996) for the period between 1993 and 2001
and Moaz’s dyadic dataset (Maoz 2005) for period prior to 1993. To estimate regime char-
acteristics, I use the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2006). Finally, I add data on the
relative power of states drawn from the National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer
1987) and information on geographic contiguity from the Direct Contiguity Dataset (Stin-
nett, et al., 2002).
Since the focus is on what is happening within rivalries, taking into account the possibil-
ity of regime transitions, the data need to reflect the within-rivalry patterns of behavior,
comparing rivalries of different regime types before and after transitions. That means that
the unit of analysis must be centered on dispute episodes; that is, individual MIDs within
the rivalry. The data set includes 1083 militarized interstate disputes spread across 248
enduring rivalries from 1816 to 2001. Each “row” in the dataset represents a single milita-
rized interstate dispute episode between two rival states. Therefore, the unit of analysis is a
conflict episode. Since an enduring rivalry is composed of several MIDs, each MID in the
data set is, by definition, “nested” within a rivalry. Following Bueno de Mesquita, Koch
and Siverson (2004: 259), I treat disputes involving more than two initial participant states
separately.
Even if a given regime change does not end a rivalry, it still affect conflict recidivism
within it. Of special concern is the length of time between dispute episodes since a longer
time intervals between outbreaks of organized violence suggests conflict amelioration.
Couched in this manner, the appropriate method is survival analysis (Cleves et al., 2010).8
6 The strategic rivalry conception (Thompson and Dreyer 2011) was not used because it had no cases of demo-
cratic transitions. As a result, no estimates of the effects of democratization were possible under strategic rivalry.
7 Those dyads with only 1 to 2 MIDs are treated as isolated conflicts. These are dropped from analysis because
they do not represent the long term persistent conflict relationships that are of interest.
8 There is as yet, no consensus on the notation used in survival analysis (also known as duration, event history or
hazard analysis). For this article, I rely on the notation used in Cleves (et al., 2010).
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This is because survival models directly estimate both the duration of peace as well as the
independent variables (the covariates), in this case regime change, which vary over time.
Survival models are less frequently used in democratic peace research but are the norm in
rivalry research.
In survival analysis, the dependent variable is the hazard rate, or the instantaneous rate
at which a failure event will occur in a given interval (the analysis time) given that the sub-
ject has already survived until time t (Bennett, 1997: 380; Cleves, et al. 2010:7-8). Applied
to the data, the subject is the rivalry dyad and the failure event is an occurrence of a mili-
tarized interstate dispute. Given that a rivalry is not at risk of experiencing the next milita-
rized interstate dispute while it is already in a current dispute, the analysis time, therefore,
is the time in between militarized interstate disputes (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004:
99). It may help to think of the survival analysis here as modeling the instantaneous rate
at which a given rivalry dyad transitions from non-violence to violence as a function of
different types of regime change.
One advantage of survival analysis is in the way it models censored data. In the dataset,
the issue is right censoring,9 which occurs when a rivalry has not terminated by the year
2001, the year the available data ends. Such cases could have experienced militarized inter-
state disputes after the time of observation. Survival analysis accounts for this by treating
such cases as having duration at least as long as the analysis time (Cleves et al., 2010: 30-1).
Dependent Variable: Interlude between militarized interstate disputes
My main dependent variable is the conflict behavior of states during their rivalry. In par-
ticular, I focus on the duration of peace in between outbreaks of fighting within rivalry.
To measure this peace-spell, I generate a continuous variable interlude, which captures
within a rivalry, the time difference in years between outbreaks of MIDs. Rivalry termi-
nation is the limiting case for interlude; that is, all terminations are associated with the
spell of peace prior to the rivalry being redefined as over. Given my focus on within riv-
alry conflict behavior, the peace-spells after rivalry termination are not an issue even
though a dyad may experience MIDs after rivalry termination. Additionally, I recode
interlude with values of 0 as missing data because the covariates of interest is by design,
yearly data.10
A secondary dependent variable is rivalry termination. Due to the fact that MIDs are
used to indicate the existence of a rivalry, we know a rivalry has ended only when no new
MID emerges after the last MID in a given rivalry sequence. I create a variable to measure
if the MID in a given rivalry is indeed the last in its sequence. This variable is called termi-
nate. It has a value of 1 if it is the last in the sequence (except for the treatment of censor-
ing discussed below) and a value of 0 otherwise. Thus all rivalries have a last MID and
thus a dispute episode in which terminate has a value of 1. This does not preclude a given
9 Left-censoring is not an issue in the data because starting point for observations is the year 1816, which is also
the starting year for the MID dataset.
10 While measures of regime transitions in Polity IV exists in both a date and a year format, the veracity of the
date format is more contested than is the case for the year format. Therefore, I took the conservative approach of
using the more general year format to measure my covariate of interest, regime change. To allay concerns about
potential overlaps between the timing of regime change and dispute initiation, I include specific dates in Appendix
1. They show that thirty-one of the thirty-three regime transitions have a MID initiation date after a regime
change is considered complete. Since the remaining two transitions suggest that it is conflict that influence
subsequent regime change, I also control for this by using a survival model with selection.
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rivalry from having a terminate value of 0 in other disputes which are not the last in a
given rivalry sequence.
Independent Variables: Regime Transitions
The independent variables focus on different measures of regime type from which the
regime transitions are derived. I rely on the Polity IV for information on regime character-
istics (Marshall and Jaggers, 2006).
For monadic measures of regime type, I transform Polity IV aggregate regime score, pol-
ity2, which is a state’s democracy characteristics minus its autocracy characteristics and
which ranges from -10 to +10, to generate the variable regime, that ranges from 0 to 100.
First, I add 10 to polity2, in order to remove negative values. Then I multiply the results
by 5 to generate the variable, regime that ranges from 0 to 100. Following the convention
suggested by Gurr and Jaggers, a state is considered a democracy if its polity2 score is at
least six and an autocracy if its polity2 score is below negative six (Jaggers and Gurr
1995). This translates into a regime score of at least 80 for democracies and a score of 20
and below for autocracies. States with values in between the two cutoff points are consid-
ered anocracies or mixed regimes.
To measure democratic dyads, I generate the variable democraticdyad, which has a value
of 1 if both states in the dyad are democratic, and a value of 0 otherwise. To measure
mixed dyads, I generate the variable mixeddyad, which has a value of 1 if one state in a
dyad is a democracy and the other is not a democracy; otherwise it has a value of 0. To
measure autocratic dyads, I generate the variable autocraticdyad, which has a value of 1 if
both states in a dyad are autocratic; otherwise it has a value of 0.
I code regime changes by comparing the dyadic regime type at the time of dispute onset
(not necessarily rivalry onset) with its dyadic regime type at the time of the previous dis-
pute’s onset within the enduring rivalry. Given three types of dyadic rivalry, democratic,
mixed and autocratic, six directions of regime change are possible. They are a transition
from an autocratic to mixed rivalry; a transition from a mixed to democratic rivalry; a
transition from autocratic to democratic rivalry; a transition from a democratic to mixed
rivalry; a transition from a mixed to autocratic rivalry; and a transition from a democratic
to autocratic rivalry. All six directional transitions are dummy variables and have a value
of 1 when the specific regime change occurs and a value of 0 otherwise. I also generate a
dyadic measure of regime change regimechange, which has a value of 1 if any of the six
directional transitions occurred and a value of 0 otherwise.
Of the 33 regime transitions in the data, 13 were transitions from mixed to democratic
rivalry, 12 were transitions from mixed to autocratic rivalry, 5 were transitions from demo-
cratic to mixed rivalry and 3 were transitions from autocratic to mixed rivalry.11 There
were zero cases of transitions from autocratic to democratic rivalry and from democratic
to autocratic rivalry. The cases are summarized in Table 1.
In additional to specific transitions, I also interested in broader transitions towards and
away from democracy. To capture information on transitions towards democracy, I gener-
ate the variable democratize, that has a value of 1 when a transition from autocratic to
11 Some may be concerned about the small number of transitions. Rarity by itself does not preclude importance.
Rare phenomena such as interstate wars or economic depressions have consequences that attract policy and schol-
arly attention. What is more, in the context of the Arab Spring, a rare event, policy-makers are understandably
interested in the implications of regime change on international stability.
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mixed rivalry or from a mixed to democratic rivalry occurs and a value of 0 otherwise. To
capture information on transitions towards autocracy, I generate the variable autocratize,
that has a value of 1 when a transition from democratic to mixed rivalry or from a mixed
to autocratic rivalry occurs and a value of 0 otherwise.
To give a sense of the cases, I list the specific transitions in appendix 1 and provide two
illustrations. The US-Ecuador rivalry illustrates the impact of a transition from a mixed to
a democratic rivalry. The rivalry revolved around the fishing rights of US vessels off the
Ecuadorian coast. The “tuna wars” intensified under the military government of Velasco
(1967-72) when US vessels were seized and the US in turn, withdrew military and eco-
nomic aid to Ecuador. It was after the democratization of Ecuador in 1979, when the Ecu-
adorian President Febres Cordero aligned its policies with the US under President Ronald
Reagan that the rivalry started to deescalate.
The Peru-Ecuador rivalry illustrates the impact of a transition in the opposite direc-
tion, from a democratic to a mixed rivalry. In that rivalry, the issue is a long running
border dispute in the upper Amazon. Tensions over the contested border outposts were
contained in the 1991 Pachacutec Incident when both rivals were democratic. After the
1992 autogople (a self coup), Peru under President Alberto Fujimori became autocratic.
The same border tensions that were previously contained escalated into the 1995 Cenepa
war, during a period of mixed rivalry. This was the most severe conflict between the two
rivals since their 1941 war. While it is true that the rivals managed to conclude a com-
prehensive peace treaty (the Brasilia Accords) in 1998, it should be noted this was after
the 1995 conflict.
Control variables: contiguity, relative power and conflict history
When addressing the issue of controls variables, I follow the injunctions of Ray (2002) and
of Achen (2002) to limit the number of controls variables with a view to the substantive
interpretation of results while avoiding omitted variable bias. Including more controls
merely to improve the fit of the model can hurt the interpretation of the results and is not
germane to a test of the hypotheses. I focus on relative power and on geographical prox-
imity, both of which have been established in the conflict literature as stable predictors of
the probability of conflict (Bremer 1992).
Realist theories place a premium on relative power as a determinant of interstate con-
flict. Traditional balance of power theory, such as that articulated by Morgenthau (1956),
Table 1: Summary of different types of regime transitions, 1816–2001
Type of regime change Absolute number
From an autocratic to mixed rivalry 3
From a mixed to democratic rivalry 13
From an autocratic to democratic rivalry 0
From a democratic to mixed rivalry 5
From a mixed to autocratic rivalry 12
From a democratic to autocratic rivalry 0
Towards democracy 16
Towards autocracy 17
Any regime change 33
Total observations in the data 1083
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argues that states need a preponderance of power before they initiate a particular round of
conflict. Thus, an interpretation is that power parity between rivals discourages the initia-
tion of militarized interstate disputes in the rivalry (Cornwell and Colaresi 2002: 335). For
measures of relative power, I use the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC)
index from the COW project which measures the weighted average of a state’s share of the
total system population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production,
military personnel and military expenditures (Singer 1987). I apply Ray and Singer’s mea-
sure of the concentration of power to the dyadic context (Ray and Singer 1979). I take the
ratio of the capability of a state over the summed capabilities of the pair, subtract .5 from
it, and take its absolute value. This generates a continuous variable that ranges from 0 to
.5 where higher values indicate greater power disparity.
Geographically proximate states have more opportunities for militarized interstate dis-
putes. Vasquez (1993) notes that contiguity helps to predict rivalry and Bueno de Mesqui-
ta, Koch and Siverson (2004: 261) note that democracies tend to be proximate to each
other. To capture information on physical contiguity, I generate the variable contiguous
which has a value of 1 when the two rival states share a land border or are separated by
no more than 150 miles of water, and a value of 0 otherwise (Stinnett et al., 2002).
While regime change is treated as a time-varying covariate in my setup, I treat both rela-
tive power (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, 2006: 340-1) and contiguity (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones, 2004: 99) as time-independent covariates. Going beyond precedence, it is worth
thinking about the theoretical relevance of the conditions under which the control vari-
ables are time-variant. Decolonization by the European powers could change both the geo-
graphical proximity and the relative power between rivals. However, the focus here is on
hostile relationships (rivalry) and not on colonial ties.
Within the conflict-begets-conflict literature, there is an argument that a prior history of
conflict influences the likelihood of subsequent conflict (Azar et al. 1978). Applied to the
data, rivalries with a disputatious history have a greater likelihood of experiencing a subse-
quent dispute independent of the condition of rivalry. Thus the Ecuador-US rivalry, which
had low disputatiousness rate, has a lower likelihood of future conflict compared to the
Israeli-Syria rivalry, with a high disputatiousness rate, even if both rivalries were to
undergo dyadic regime change at the same time. To capture this notion of a prior history
of conflict, I generate the variable, prior conflict history, also referred to as H to save
space, to indicate the serial sequence of militarized interstate disputes within a rivalry.12
To address the interaction of regime change with the disputatious rate, I multiply H with
democratize and separately with autocratize, creating D*H and A*H respectively.
Survival Models
I use both Weibull and Cox regression models to investigate the relationship between
regime change and conflict behavior. The Weibull model is used when there are theoretical
expectations about the distribution of the baseline hazard. By contrast, the Cox model is
used when the researcher wish to be agnostic with regards to the distribution of the base-
line hazard. As there are arguments for the use of either model, the use of both models
doubles as a check of robustness. Ideally, the regime change of interest, democratization,
should exhibit the same relationship with conflict behavior under both models.
12 This identifying variable is called eventseq in the replication file.
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The case for the use of the Weibull model is theoretical. Bennett’s account suggests that
the interlude between militarized interstate disputes could shorten after democratization,
thereby implying an increasing hazard (Bennett, 1997). Conversely in Prins and Daxecker,
democratizing states gain signaling credibility which increases the interlude between milita-
rized interstate disputes, thereby implying a decreasing hazard (Prins and Daxecker, 2007).
Since the Weibull model allows the distribution of the baseline hazard to be monotonically
increasing, monotonically decreasing or flat with respect to time, both theoretical accounts
can be represented by the same model.
The case for the use of the Cox model is methodological. Most theories in political sci-
ence do not specify the distribution of the hazard rate ((Box-Steffensmeier, and Zorn,
2001; Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn, 2003). Since the Cox model does not require a
specification of the baseline hazard, its use has been consequently widespread. Applied to
my data, it is worth considering the risk process (by which the failure event is generated)
itself. We know that democracy exhibits a strong selection effect on rivalry and that one
way by which this is achieved is that transitions to democracy end rivalry. What is unclear,
and this is a contribution of this study, is how such rivalry termination is achieved. After
regime-change, two rivals can fight with greater frequency resulting in the settlement of the
rivalry on the victor’s terms. Alternatively, the same two rivals could reduce their disputa-
tiousness, allowing the rivalry to peter out. In the former process, the interlude between
militarized interstate disputes is shortened. In the latter, the interlude is lengthened.
Because rivalry termination is an equifinal outcome which can occur as the result of two
distinct risk processes and we do not know which of the two baseline hazards is correct,
the use of the Cox model is appropriate.
To test for the effects of directional regime change, I estimate a basic model compro-
mised of the covariates of interest, the controls for relative power, contiguity and prior
conflict history. To account for the possibility that each rivalry has its own unique baseline
hazard, as opposed to a single baseline hazard for all rivalries, I re-run each model twice
by using the cluster routine in Stata 12. The results for all models in Table 1 to 4 were
obtained using robust standard errors and reported as hazard ratios.
To correct for a possible selection bias due to the effects of prior participation in conflict
on subsequent regime change, I use a survival model with selection. This estimator, termed
dursel for duration with selection, by its creators (Boehmke, Morey and Shannon 2006),
can be thought of as the survival equivalent to Heckman models used in regression analy-
sis. Applied to this context, the selection equation is accounting for the prospects of dyadic
regime change whereas the survival equation is accounting for the effects of specific regime
transitions on the interlude between MIDs.13 The estimator requires an omitted category. I
choose the transitions from autocratic to mixed rivalry as the omitted category as it has
the fewest cases.
To model the prospect of a dyadic regime change within rivalry, I use information on
per capita income and the prior conflict history in the rivalry. Economic development is
generally posited by modernization theory to be a condition for regime change. In one for-
mulation, high income levels helps democracies stay democratic but does not otherwise
promote democratization (Przeworski et al. 2000). This means the impact of economic
13 Since the estimator in question dursel can only estimate the selection effects for one country and I am using riv-
alry dyads in my data, I identified the country with the lower polity2 score in the rivalry as the country more
likely to undergo regime transitions. This follows the weakest-link approach used in the democractic peace litera-
ture (Dixon and Senese 2002). I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting its use.
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development on dyadic regime change could work in either direction but in the long run,
wealth is correlated with democracy since wealthy democracies tend to stay democratic. I
use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) information from Maddison (Bolt and van Zanden
2013).14 To capture information on the economic development of the country with the
lower polity2 score, I use per capita GDP to control for population size and estimate the
natural logarithm of the information to generate the variable, logged Income Per Capita.
The reverse causation argument is that participation in conflict itself affects the likeli-
hood of subsequent regime change. Such participation can reduce the chance of democrati-
zation (Horowitz 2003) and the absence of such conflict can be conducive for
democratization (Gibler and Tir 2010). In the diversionary conflict literature (Mitchell and
Prins 2004), a rivalry provides an opportunity-rich environment for leaders to engage in
foreign diversions, which in turn implies a lower likelihood of regime change. The litera-
ture suggests that the longer a state participates in conflict, the lower the likelihood of sub-
sequent regime change. Since the act of being in a rivalry already implies participation, I
make use of an existing variable, prior conflict history or H to capture the participation in
conflict. Since the aforementioned literature also differentiates between democratization
from other types of regime transitions, it may be the case that it is the interaction of a spe-
cific regime transition with its conflict history that affects the subsequent interlude. There-
fore, I also generate the relevant interaction terms by multiplying each of the specific
regime transition in question (for example, from mixed to democratic rivalry) with prior
conflict history (H).
Armed with a selection equation, I estimate two Weibull models with selection.15 The
first model utilizes all the covariates previously used in the Weibull without selection. The
second model adds to the first the interaction terms between the specific regime transition
and their prior conflict history. Adding the interaction terms captures the notion that dif-
ferent specific regime transitions behave differently the deeper they are in a given rivalry. I
also conduct post-survival analysis on the total effects of specific regime change on conflict
behavior. The aim is to determine if the transitions of interests still have significant rela-
tionships with interlude after selection is accounted for.
Findings
Since there no cases of transitions from democratic to autocratic rivalry and vice versa, no
estimation of their effects was possible. This is why there are only four types of regime
change in tables 2 and 3.
Table 2 reports the results for specific regime transitions using Weibull regression.
Model 1 uses a generic baseline hazard for all rivalry while model 2 uses a unique baseline
hazard for each rivalry. Although the general results are robust across other model specifi-
cations, the results for transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry are not robust across
alternative specifications.16 The remaining three directional regime transitions have statisti-
14 I use Maddison’s data (Bolt and van Zanden 2013) rather than Gleditsch’s data (2002) because the former can
cover the years of interest (1816-2001). Since there are missing economic information in Maddison’s data, the
result after the dataset merge is a smaller set of observations.
15 The estimator dursel is not able to utilize Cox models.
16 I also run a model that contains only the covariates for regime change and a model that adds the controls for
relative power and contiguity. As the results are not substantively different, these are not reported here to con-
serve space.
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cally significant relationships with the risk of conflict outbreaks in both models. In each
model, transitions from mixed to autocratic rivalry, transitions from an autocratic to
mixed rivalry, and transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry reduce the risk of out-
breaks of conflict by 55.3%, 47.4% and by 61.5% respectively, holding all other variables
constant. These effects are not significantly different from each other. All three directions
of regime change favor diminished conflict.
The fact that the hazard ratios reported in model 1 and 2 were identical suggests that
the relationships of interests are not dependent on the specification of the baseline hazard.
The control variables in the models have a hazard ratio above 1, which means they
increase the risk of outbreaks of conflict. Relative power did not have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the risks in either model. Once the states decide to become rivals, relative
power does not appear to be a driver of subsequent rounds of conflict. The substantive
impact of the remaining controls that are statistically significant is much smaller. Under
both models, being contiguous and having a prior history of conflict increase the risk of
outbreaks of conflict by 22.4% and 4.3% respectively.
A similar pattern of results emerges when Cox regression is used.17 As before, model 1
uses a generic baseline hazard while model 2 uses a unique baseline hazard for each riv-
alry. The results in Table 3 show that only three types of transitions have statistically sig-
nificant relationships with the risk of conflict outbreaks in both models. In each model,
transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry, transitions from autocratic to mixed rivalry,
and transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry reduce the risk of outbreaks of conflict
by 46.6%, 39.4% and by 53% respectively, holding all other variables constant. The effects
of transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry vary across the specifications and are not
robust. The fact that the substantive impact of these transitions is identical in both models
implies that the relationships of interests are not dependent upon the specification of the
baseline hazard. Of the control variables, only a prior history of conflict (eventseq) was
consistently significant.18 Its substantive impact however is weak. In both models, each
militarized interstate dispute in a rivalry increases the risk of a subsequent militarized dis-
pute by a mere 2.9%.
Except for transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry, the other three transitions types
reduce the risk of outbreaks of conflict in each Weibull and Cox regression models. The
finding that transitions from mixed to autocratic rivalry reduce the risk of conflict out-
breaks contradicts the dangerous autocratization hypothesis (H2). The finding that transi-
tions from autocratic to mixed rivalry reduce the risk of conflict outbreaks contradicts the
political dissimilarity thesis (H3). By contrast, the finding that transitions from mixed to
democratic rivalry reduce the risk of outbreaks of conflict supports the pacific democrati-
zation thesis (H1b).
These findings suggest at least two possible explanations for the growing time between
disputes following regime change: the rivals are winding down their dispute and moving to
the end of the rivalry or the rivals are taking some time while they sort out their new insti-
tutional situation before resuming their rivalry. I can test which, if either, of these accounts
dominates and whether that account varies with the type of regime change. To do so, I
switch from a hazard analysis to a logit analysis and switch from interlude as the depen-
17 I tested for violations of the proportional hazard assumptions (PHA) using Schoenfeld residuals. The results,
recorded in the replication file, show that the PHA is not violated.
18 The results did not change substantively when relative power is treated as a time-invariant or time-independent
covariate.
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dent variable to rivalry termination. If democratization, for instance, is pacifying then I
should observe, as I have, that the spell between disputes grows longer and I should also
observe that the probability of termination increases with democratization, especially the
deeper the states are into the rivalry. Likewise, if the situational context is all that is delay-
ing subsequent disputes, then I should find, again using democratization as the illustrative
case, that democratization has no impact on the probability of termination even if the riv-
als have a long prior history of conflict. To evaluate the contending arguments, I run logit
analyses using the same set of control variables with measures of broad transitions, democ-
ratize and autocratize in model 1. I then repeat the test adding the interaction terms.
Table 4 reports the results of two logit analyses using robust standard errors. Model 1
shows that autocratization is not close to having a significant impact on rivalry termina-
Table 2: Specific regime change and the risk of militarized disputes using Weibull regression
Weibull
Model 1 without clustering Model 2 with clustering
Hazard Ratio
Standard
Error p-value Hazard Ratio
Standard
Error* p-value
Regime transition from:
mixed to democratic .385 .133 .006 .385 .131 .005
autocratic to mixed .526 .139 .015 .526 .138 .014
mixed to autocratic .447 .071 .000 .447 .074 .000
democratic to mixed .455 .170 .035 .455 .165 .030
Controls
Relative power 1.086 .304 .769 1.086 .326 .784
Contiguity 1.224 .118 .036 1.224 .119 .038
Prior conflict history 1.043 .009 .000 1.043 .007 .000
Observations
Prob>chi2
1083
.000
1083
.000
(Notes. *standard errors adjusted for 247 clusters.)
Table 3: Specific regime change and the risk of militarized disputes using Cox regression
Cox
Model 1 without clustering Model 2 with clustering
Hazard Ratio
Standard
Error p-value
Hazard
Ratio
Standard
Error* p-value
Regime transition from:
mixed to democratic .470 .129 .006 .470 .128 .006
autocratic to mixed .606 .131 .020 .606 .129 .019
mixed to autocratic .534 .074 .000 .534 .076 .000
democratic to mixed .565 .168 .055 .565 .166 .052
Controls
Relative power 0.998 .190 .991 .998 .215 .992
Contiguity 1.138 .071 .040 1.138 .078 .058
Prior conflict history 1.029 .006 .000 1.029 .004 .000
Observations
Prob>chi2
1083
.000
1083
.000
(Notes. *standard errors adjusted for 247 clusters.)
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tion. Democratization on its own increases the odds of termination, with statistical signifi-
cance of 0.061 in a two-tailed test. Shifting to the more demanding tests that include inter-
action terms in model 2, the data show that democratic transitions by themselves increase
the log-odds of rivalry termination by 3.383, holding all other independent variables con-
stant. Since log-odds ratio can be hard to interpret, I convert them to the predicted proba-
bility of rivalry termination for ease of interpretation. When a rivalry dyad transitions in a
democratic direction, the probability of rivalry termination is 82.7%.
When I take into consideration both democratization and the prior history of conflict in
the rivalry I discover that the marginal impact of democratization condition on prior
conflict greatly increases the probability that the rivalry comes to an end as anticipated
by hypotheses 4b. The effect of democratization on rivalry termination, taking prior his-
tory into account, is significant at the 0.013 level [Democratization + Prior History of Con-
flict + (Democratization*Prior History of Conflict)]. Turning to the same test, but for
autocratization, I find something quite different. The effect of autocratization on rivalry
termination by itself is insignificant. Indeed, the probability that the observed relationship
occurred by chance is 0.922. Looking at the effect of autocratization, prior history of con-
flict and the interaction of the two, I discover that there is a 0.785 probability that the
relationship is due to chance. This finding is contrary to hypothesis 4a, regime change per
se does not sustain rivalry.19 Consistent with the democratic peace argument, democratiza-
Table 4: Directional regime change and rivalry termination using Logistical regression
Logit
Model 1 without interaction Model 2 with interaction
Coeff.
Robust
Standard Error p-value Coeff.
Robust
Standard Error p-value
Democratization (D) .999 .533 .061 3.383 1.409 .016
Autocratization (A) .956 1.031 0.354 .117 1.201 .922
Interaction Term
Democratization* Prior
conflict history (D*H)
.636 .363 .080
Autocratization* Prior
conflict history (A*H)
.409 .169 .015
Controls
Relative power .587 .625 .348 .593 .630 .347
Contiguity .129 .185 .484 .123 .185 .506
Prior conflict
History (H)
.017 .020 .383 .014 .020 .487
Constant 1.766 .279 .000 1.790 .280 .000
Test: D + H + D*H = 0 v2 = 6.19, p < 0.013
Test: A + H + A*H = 0 v2 = 0.07, p < .786
Observations
Prob>chi2
1083
.1803
1083
.0097
19 To determine the total impact of regime change and prior history of conflict on rivalry termination, I tested
whether Democratize + Autocratize + Prior History of Conflict + the two interaction terms is significantly differ-
ent from 0. It is not (p = .122).
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tion not only promotes lengthy interludes between spells of conflict but also significantly
hastens rivalry termination.
The evidence strongly supports the claim that democratization, especially when coupled
with a long sequence of prior disputes, leads to termination but that autocratization, even
when associated with a long sequence of prior disputes, does not. Rather, autocratizaton
reduces the prospects of termination. Democratization it seems, promotes international sta-
bility by rendering the outbreaks of conflict more sporadic over time.
We can further explore if the relationship between specific regime transitions and interlude
holds when the selection process by which dyadic regime change occurs is taken into account.
Table 5 presents the results. The first model shows what the results of the Weibull model are
(previously presented in Model 1 of Table 2) controlling for selection. This is also why inter-
action terms were not used. The selection assessment in Model 1 reveals that a history of con-
flict reduces the likelihood of the rivalry experiencing dyadic regime change in a statistically
significant manner. This dovetails with the theoretical literature (example, Horowitz 2003)
which argues that participation in war retards democratization and by extension regime
change. By contrast, economic development has no statistically significant relationship with
the likelihood of dyadic regime change. This result dovetails with the argument (Przeworski
et al. 2000) that wealth alone does not necessarily promote democratization. The survival
assessment in Model 1 reveals that of the three specific regime transitions, only transitions
from mixed to democratic rivalries has a statistically significant relationship with interlude.
Such democratizations increase the peace-spell between MIDs. In the follow-up analysis, I
test whether the total effect of each specific regime transition, taking prior history into
account, is significantly different from a null hypothesis that the total effect is zero. Of the
Table 5: Specific regime change and the risk of militarized disputes using Weibull with selection.
Weibull
Model 1 without interaction terms Model 2 with interaction terms
Coefficient
Robust
Standard
Error p-value Coefficient
Robust
Standard
Error p-value
Selection for dyadic regime change
Prior conflict history (H) .020 .009 .025 .020 .009 .025
Logged Income Per Capita .110 .065 .090 .110 .064 .087
Duration of interlude
mixed to democratic 1.595 .602 .008 3.900 .949 .000
mixed to autocratic .214 .462 .644 .713 .653 .275
democratic to mixed .767 .663 .248 2.055 .921 .026
Interaction between regime change and conflict history (H)
mixed to democratic*H .719 .206 .000
mixed to autocratic*H .408 .177 .021
democratic to mixed*H .553 .177 .002
Controls
Relative power 2.191 .928 .018 2.359 1.129 .037
Contiguity .091 .409 .823 .069 .391 .859
Prior conflict history .204 .058 .000 .374 .161 .021
Observations
Prob>chi2
841
.0117
841
.000
(Notes. There were 31 uncensored observations)
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three regime transitions, only the mixed to democratic transition is statistically significant at
the .009 level (mixed to democratic transition+ prior history of conflict).
Model 2 reruns the analysis with the interaction terms included. The selection assess-
ment is broadly similar. A history of conflict reduces the likelihood of dyadic regime
change while economic development has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood
of democratization. The survival assessment in Model 2 reveals that mixed to democratic
transitions increase the interlude, with a p-value of .000. It also shows that democratic to
mixed transitions increase the interlude, with a p-value of .026. To parse between the spe-
cific transitions, I also test if the total effect of each specific regime transition, taking prior
history and the respective interaction term into account, is significantly different from a
null hypothesis that the total effect is zero. The tests reveal a similar pattern of significance
as in Model 1. Of three regime transitions, only the mixed to democratic transition is sta-
tistically significant at the .000 level [mixed to democratic transition + Prior History of
Conflict + (mixed to democratic transition*Prior History of Conflict)]. In alternative speci-
fications of the dursel estimator conducted as robustness checks, a similar pattern of signif-
icance was found.20 The total effects of mixed to democratic transitions, unlike the case
for the other regime transitions, are always significant.
Collectively, the results in Table 5 improve our confidence in the finding that mixed to
democratic transitions increase the peaceful interlude between rivals, even when controlling
for selection. It constitutes further empirical support for the pacific democratization thesis
(H1b).
Conclusion
This paper tests four perspectives on the democratization-conflict linkage in the domain of
enduring rivalry. Of the regime transitions that were found to reduce the risk of outbreaks
of militarized conflict within rivalry, only transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry sup-
ports the pacific democratization thesis. This relationship holds up when selection for dya-
dic regime change is taken into account. I also unpack the process of rivalry termination
itself. Unlike autocratization, democratization ends rivalry by making the outbreaks of
conflict more sporadic over time. These results suggest that the inverse relationship
between democratization and conflict recidivism is robust.
One concern over the use of the variable interlude to measure peaceful spells within
enduring rivalries is whether a longer interlude between militarized interstate disputes after
democratization is representative of conflict amelioration. For example, militarized inter-
state disputes after democratization could have reached a higher level of escalation. This is
a complex issue as the observed level of escalation in a militarized interstate dispute may
not be its potential level of escalation due to both selection effects and endogeneity (Smith
1999). I plan to address this issue in follow-up research. In particular, the finding that
autocratization or the transition from mixed to autocratic rivalry also reduces the risk of
conflict outbreaks is intriguing and deserves further study.
As a policy objective, democracy promotion has had a poor historical record (Enter-
line, Grieg 2008). It reduces the amount of aid received (Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair
Smith 2009). It retards post war economic recovery (Flores and Nooruddin 2008). It leads
to realignment against the United States (Ratner 2009). No wonder democracy promotion
has fallen out of fashion lately. That said, one should compare democracy promotion
20 These are reported in the replication file to conserve space.
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with comparable policy alternatives. Consider for example, the contemporary Middle
East. It is remarkable that the United States persists in launching yet another Middle
Eastern peace initiative while avoiding a serious engagement with democratic forces
within the Arab states. This is despite the fact that ending the rivalry between Israel and
its Arab neighbors may be more of a pipe dream than promoting democracy in the
Middle East. While resolving the issues underlying a rivalry is most desirable, democrati-
zation may be all that the policymaker has to work with; and it may be sufficient to do
the job.
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Appendix 1.List of all regime transitions
Transitions from mixed to democratic rivalry
No Rivalry dyad Country under transition Transition end date MID start date
1 Ecuador-USA Ecuador 30/04/1979 25/10/1980
2 Russia-USA Russia 26/03/2000 01/11/2000
3 Russia-Canada Russia 26/03/2000 01/11/2000
4 Honduras-El Salvador El Salvador 02/06/1984 23/05/1989
5 Russia-Norway Russia 26/03/2000 14/02/2001
6 Russia-Turkey Russia 26/03/2000 18/06/2000
7 Syria-Israel Syria 26/02/1954 28/02/1954
8 South Korea-Japan South Korea 26/02/1988 13/02/1996
9 India-Pakistan Pakistan 17/11/1988 11/02/1990
10 India-Bangladesh Bangladesh 26/09/1991 25/06/1996
11 Honduras-Nicaragua Nicaragua 27/02/1990 02/02/1991
12 Venezuela-Guyana Guyana 06/10/1992 03/10/1999
13 Russia-Japan Russia 26/03/2000 21/04/2000
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Transitions from mixed to autocratic rivalry
No Rivalry dyad Country under transition Transition end date MID start date
1 Chile-Argentina Chile 12/09/1973 14/07/1977
2 France-Russia France 03/11/1852 13/06/1853
3 Greece-Bulgaria Greece 05/08/1936 11/10/1940
4 Cameroon-Nigeria Nigeria 01/01/1984 02/05/1987
5 Uganda-Kenya Uganda 20/12/1969 13/02/1973
6 Kenya-Somalia Somalia 22/10/1969 23/06/1977
7 Somalia-Ethiopia Somalia 22/10/1969 01/04/1973
8 Ethiopia-Sudan Sudan 13/10/1971 01/03/1975
9 China-Burma Burma 01/07/1963 01/01/1969
10 France-Germany France 03/11/1852 06/06/1859
11 Germany-Italy Germany 15/07/1933 25/07/1934
12 Uganda-Sudan Sudan 13/10/1971 15/12/1971
Transitions from autocratic to mixed rivalry
No Rivalry dyad Country under transition Transition end date MID start date
1 Ethiopia-Sudan Sudan 02/04/1986 05/12/1986
2 Syria-Jordan Syria 26/02/1954 13/04/1957
3 China-Philippines Philippines 03/02/1987 01/01/1995
Transitions from democratic to mixed rivalry
No Rivalry dyad Country under transition Transition end date MID start date
1 Ecuador-Peru Peru 01/01/1992 09/01/1995
2 Belgium-Germany Germany 15/07/1933 07/03/1936
3 Greece-Turkey Turkey 13/09/1980 21/03/1981
4 Russia-Ukraine Russia 16/10/1993 08/04/1994
5 France-Germany Germany 15/07/1933 07/03/1936
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